





1.1 Background of Study 
In Centralised Utility Facilities Kertih (CUFK), there are many of centrifugal pump 
that use for transfer liquid from one place to another place. There is one pump that 
has many problems during its operation and due to this problems, the current pump 
reliability is reduce and not achieve the company target. The pump is the Liquid 
Oxygen (LOX) Process Pump. The appendix 1 shows the diagram of the LOX 
Process pump. So, this project will use the LOX Process pump as a Reliability 
Centered Maintenance (RCM) case study. The LOX Process pump function are for 
transport the Liquid Oxygen from Low pressure or High pressure Column to liquid 
oxygen storage. The reliability of the LOX Process pump can be improved by 
implementing the RCM.  
 
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) is an industrial improvement approach 
focused on identifying and establishing the operational, maintenance, and capital 
improvement policies that will manage the risks of equipment failure most 
effectively. Reliability Centered Maintenance can be used to create a cost-effective 
maintenance strategy and to address dominant causes of pump failure. It is a 
systematic approach to defining a routine maintenance program composed of cost-
effective tasks that preserve important functions [1]. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
In industry world, the theoretical RCM method are not the same that the method or 
system that the company used. The similarities and differences of this method have 
to be identified. For the case study, the LOX Process Pump is one of the most 
important pumps that operating in CUFK plan. This pump is having many problems 
during the operation and the maintenance cost for this pump is too high. The critical 
part of the pump is the MTBF of the pump and the pump equipment criticality. The 
current pump MTBF is about 1 month per failure and this MTBF value are too low 




For the equipment criticality, there is no revised equipment criticality assessment for 
2 year period (2008 – 2009) and some of the equipment part are fall under lower 
critically rating (rating 1).  So, with this project, will revised the Equipment 
Criticality for the LOX process pump and proposed possible solution for the possible 
failure cause to improve the pump MTBF value and its reliability.  
 
1.3 Objectives 
The objectives of the project are: 
a) To compare the RCM implemented at CUF Kertih with the theoretical RCM 
analysis process to identify the differences similarities between these two 
analysis.    
b) To assess the Equipment Critically for 2008-2009 to identify the criticality of 
each pump equipment. 
c) To perform the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) to identify the 
failure mode and effect of each failure mode to the pump and its operation. 
 
1.4 Scope of Study 
The project is start with the study of the concept and process theoretical RCM and 
RCM implemented at CUFK. Next step is to perform the Equipment Criticality 
Analysis to revise the equipment criticality and also to identify the pump component 
that bring major consequence to the plan. Next are the Failure Mode Effects and 
Effect Analysis (FMEA). All the failure mode and failure effect will be analysis. 
This FMEA is to identify the potential causes of the system failure before the failure 














LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY 
 
2.1 Reliability  
Reliability is the probability that an item will operate in given operating period, 
under specified operating conditions, without failure [13].  
2.1.1 Reliability Parameter 
a. Failure Rate 
The rate at which failures occur in a specified time interval is called the failure rate 
during that interval. The failure rate (Fr) is expressed as [8]: 
 
Fr = No. of failures/Total operating hours                 (2.1) 
                   = λ  
b. Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) 
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) is the average frequency with which a 
equipment fails, the average time between failure or the length of time a component 
or equipment is expected to work without failure. It is also an indicator of system 
reliability that is calculated from known failure rates of various equipment 
components [12]. MTBF is the reliability parameter of determining the reliability of 
the equipment; it indicates the failure rate of equipment and its components and is 
usually given in units of hours. The equipment is more reliable when the MTBF is 
higher. The MTBF can be computed as:  
                                                              
                                                             
                                                 MTBF = 1/ λ      (2.2)                
 









2.2 Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) 
RCM is a process used to determine what must be done to ensure that any physical 
asset continues the desired standard performance in its present operating context. 
RCM also is a technique for developing a reliability maintenance program [1]. It is 
based on the assumption that the inherent reliability of the equipment is a function of 
the design and the build quality. An effective reliability maintenance program will 
ensure that the inherent reliability is realized. It cannot, however, improve the 
reliability of the system. This is only possible through redesign or modification. 
 
RCM was designed to improved equipment operating performance, greater 
maintenance cost effectiveness and also will improve safety and environmental 
integrity. 
An RCM analysis basically provides answers to the following seven questions: 
1) What are the functions and associated performance standards of the 
equipment in its present operating context? 
2) In what ways does it fail to fulfill its functions? 
3) What is the cause of each functional failure? 
4) What happens when each failure occurs? 
5) In what way does each failure matter? 
6) What can be done to prevent each failure? 
7) What should be done if a suitable preventive task cannot be found? 
 
2.3 Reliability Maintenance Methods 
The reliability maintenance of today can be divided into two major group, preventive 
maintenance (PM) and corrective maintenance (CM). Preventive maintenance has 
also been divided into two categories, condition based and predetermined 




Figure 2.1: Type of reliability maintenance methods. [9] 
 
2.3.1 Corrective Maintenance 
Corrective maintenance is performed with the intension to restore a function after a 
failure has occurred. Corrective maintenance also goes under the name unplanned or 
unscheduled maintenance  
 
Corrective maintenance has been divided into two subgroups, immediate and 
deferred, where the deferred maintenance has been chosen and is quite good. The 
immediate maintenance is the negative maintenance, which goes under the name 
„unplanned‟. 
 
2.3.2 Preventive Maintenance  
Preventive maintenance activity to reduce the probability of failure before the failure 
has occurred. This is done by either predetermined or condition base maintenance. 
Predetermined maintenance is carried out according to maintenance schedules, in 
time intervals. Predetermined maintenance is done on the equipment regardless of 
the status of them. The interval must be adapted, so that it doesn‟t become corrective 
maintenance. Predetermined maintenance is done on simple items or complex items 
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Condition based maintenance is done through a maintenance schedule, but instead of 
exchanging the items directly, a check of the items status is done before replacing it. 
Condition based equipment is also suitable for condition monitoring, due to the fact 
that all item give some kind of signal before they break. 
 
2.4 Reliability Centered Maintenance Analysis Process 
The RCM analysis may be carried out as a sequence of activities or steps. This is the 
list of RCM process: 
1) Study preparation 
2) Define the functions of each asset in its operating context, together with the 
associated desired standards of performance.  
3) Identification of Functional Failures 
4) Identification of Failure Mode 
5) Identification of the Failure Effect 
6) Identification of Failure Consequence 
7) Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
8) Selection of recommendation action 
 
2.4.1 Study preparation 
Overall drawings and process diagrams, like technical description of the equipment 
system (capacity, operating condition, equipment description), piping and 
instrumentation diagrams, P&ID, pump process flow diagram, historical PM and 
CBM schedule, operation logbook, maintenance record, past Failure and Effect 
Analysis and operation efficiency record must be collected and study. All this data 
are importance in RCM process because this data will be use for further RCM 










2.4.2 Define the functions of each asset in its operating context, together with the 
associated desired standards of performance.  
The functions of each asset in its operating context can be split into two categories: 
1) Primary functions, which summarize why the asset was acquired in the first 
place. This category of functions covers issues such as speed, output, carrying 
or storage capacity, product quality, and customer service. 
2) Secondary functions, which recognize that every asset is expected to do more 
than simply fulfill its primary functions. Users also have expectations in areas 
such as safety, control, containment, comfort, structural integrity, economy, 
protection, and efficiency of operation, environmental compliance and even 
the appearance of the asset. 
 
The performance standard can be defined in two ways, as follow: 
1) Desired performance ( what the user want the asset to do ) 
2) Built in capability (what it can do) 
 
For any asset to be maintainable, the desired performance of the asset must fall 
within the envelope of its initial capability. In order to determine this is so, not only 
the initial capabilities of the asset need to know, the exact minimum performance 
also need to know. The figure 2.2 will show the differences between the initial 




























Figure 2.2: Difference between initial capability and desired performance [1] 
 
2.4.3 Identification of Functional Failures 
Functional failure will describe the potential system failure modes. In most of the 
RCM references the system failure modes are denote functional failures. A variety of 
classifications schemes for failure modes have been published. Some of these 
schemes may be used to secure that all relevant functional failures are identified. The 
classification of failures as follows: 
1) Sudden failures are failures that could not be forecast by prior testing or 
examination. 
2) Gradual failures are failures that could be forecast by testing or examination. 
A gradual failure will represent a gradual „drifting out‟ of the specified range 
of performance values. The recognition of gradual failures requires 
comparison of actual device performance with a performance specification, 
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2.4.4 Identification of the Failure Mode 
A failure mode could be defined as any event which is likely to cause an asset or 
system to fail. More precise definition of failure mode is any event which causes a 
functional failure. The best way to show the connection and the distinction between 
failed states and the event which could cause them is to list functional failures first, 
then to record the failure modes which could cause each functional failure. 
A list of possible failure mode should be including the following: 
1) Failures which have occurred before 
2) Failure mode which are already the subject of proactive maintenance 
routines. 
3) Any other failure mode which have not yet occurred but which are considered 
to be real possibilities. 
 
2.4.5 Identification of the Failure Effect 
Failure effect describes what happens when a failure mode occurs. A description of 
failure effect should include all the information needed to support the evaluation of 
the consequence of the failure. Specifically, when describing the effect of a failure, 
the following should be recorded: 
1) what evidence (if any) that the failure has occurred 
2) In what ways (if any) it poses a threat to safety or the environment 
3) In what ways (if any) it affects production or operations. 
4) What physical damage (if any) is caused by the failure 
5) What must be done to repair the failure?  
 
2.4.6 Identification of Failure Consequence 
Failure consequences are classified into three categories in descending order of 
importance, as follow: 
1) Safety and environmental consequence: A failure has safety consequence if 
it could injure or kill someone. It has environmental consequences if it leads 
to a breach of any corporate, regional or national environmental standard. 
2) Operational consequence: A failure has operational consequences if it 
effects production or operations( output, product quality, customer service or 




3) Non-operational consequence: Evident failure in this category affect neither 
safety nor production cost in addition to the direct cost of repair. 
 
2.4.7 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
FMEA is a design evaluation procedure used to identify potential failure modes and 
determined the effect of each on the system performance. It a combination of the 
identification of the equipment function, equipment standard performance, functional 
failure, failure mode and effect, and the failure consequence [10]. All the identified 
function, functional failure, and failure effect will be filled in the FMEA worksheet. 
Example of the FMEA worksheet is shown at APPENDIX 1. 
 
2.4.8 Selection of Maintenance Actions 
This step is the most novel compared to other maintenance planning techniques. 
Decision logic is used to guide the analyst through a question-and-answer process. 
The input to the RCM decision logic is the dominant failure modes from the FMEA. 
The main idea is for each dominant failure mode to decide whether a PM task is 
applicable and effective, or it will be best to let the item deliberately run to failure 
and afterwards carry out a corrective maintenance task. There are generally three 
main reasons for doing a PM task. First is to prevent a failure, second is to detect the 
onset of a failure and lastly to discover a hidden failure. 
 
In selection of maintenance action, the following basic maintenance tasks are 
considered: 
1) Scheduled on-condition task is a task to determine the condition of an item, for 
example, by condition monitoring. There are three criteria that must be met for an 
on-condition task to be applicable.  
a) It must be possible to detect reduced failure resistance for a specific failure 
mode. 
b) It must be possible to define a potential failure condition that can be detected 
by an explicit task. 
c) There must be a reasonable consistent age interval between the time of 







Figure 2.3: Potential Failure – Functional Failure Curve [1] 
 
2) Scheduled overhaul may be performed of an item at or before some specified age 
limit, and is often called „hard time maintenance‟. An overhaul task is considered 
applicable to an item only if the following criteria are met. 
a) There must be an identifiable age at which there is a rapid increase in the 
item‟s failure rate function. 
b) A large proportion of the units must survive to that age. 
c) It must be possible to restore the original failure resistance of the item by 
reworking it. 
3) Scheduled replacement is replacement of an item (or one of its parts) at or before 
some specified age limit. A scheduled replacement task is applicable only under the 
following circumstances. 
a) The item must be subject to a critical failure. 
b) Test data must show that no failures are expected to occur below the specified 
life limit. 
c) The item must be subject to a failure that has major economic (but not safety) 
consequences. 
d) There must be an identifiable age at which the item shows a rapid increase in 
the failure rate function. 




4) Scheduled function test is a scheduled failure-finding task or inspection of a 
hidden function to identify any failure. Failure-finding tasks are preventive only in 
the sense that they prevent surprises by revealing failures of hidden functions. A 
scheduled function test task is applicable to an item under the following conditions. 
a) The item must be subject to a functional failure that is not evident to the 
operating crew during the performance f normal duties. 
b) The item must be one for which no other type of task is applicable and 
effective. 
 
5) Run to failure is a deliberate decision to run to failure because the other tasks are 
not possible or the economics are less favorable. PM will not prevent all failures. 
Consequently, if there is a clear identifiable failure mode that cannot be adequately 
addressed by an applicable and effective PM task that will reduce the probability of 
failure to an acceptable level, then there is needed to redesign or modify the item. If 
the consequences of failure relate to safety or the environment then this redesign 
recommendation will normally be mandatory. For operational and economic 
consequences of failure this may be desirable, but a cost-benefit assessment has to be 
performed. 
The criteria given for using the various tasks should only be considered as guidelines 
for selecting an appropriate task. A task might be found appropriate even if some of 
the criteria are not fulfilled. A variety of different RCM decision logic diagrams are 










2.5 Equipment Reliability Strategy (ERS) 
ERS is a systematic and comprehensive reliability strategy methodology that used to 
drive specific analysis and step to ensure the plan equipment operates in the standard 
desired performance. It also used achieve improvements in fields such as the 
establishment of safe minimum levels of maintenance, minimize the equipment 
failure consequence and changes to operating procedures and strategies and the 
establishment of capital maintenance regimes and plans. The activities and analysis 
that involve in the ERS such as: 
1) Equipment failure data gathering 
2) Equipment Criticality Analysis 
3) Root cause Failure Analysis 
4) Asset strategy 
















Figure 2.4: Equipment Reliability Strategy process flow [3] 
2.5.1 Equipment Failure Data Gathering 
After the failure of the equipment occurs, there must be a step that record and collect 
the data regarding the equipment failure such as the time, location, the operation 
record, the effect of the failure in term of the economic, health and safety, and 
environment, and the failure industry data. The failure histories of the equipment also 
need to be collected in order to do the further analysis. This step is important to 
provide the evident of the failure and can initiate another process of the ERS.  
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2.5.2 Equipment Criticality Analysis 
ECA is the method of analysis that contains the economic, health and safety, and 
environment evaluation for each of the equipment failures and assigns the plan 
equipment criticality based on risk level. This analysis objective is: 
1) Record and evaluate the economic losses in term of the production loss and 
maintenance cost for the equipment failure 
2) Record and evaluate the health and safety, and environment issue regarding 
the failure problem. 
3) Identify the equipment criticality based on risk to priorities the strategy effort. 
The evaluations of the criticality of the equipment are based on the risk level.  
2.5.2.1 Risk Definition 
Risks are events or occurrences that prevent asset or equipment from achieving 
performance objectives of target [4]. The risk level can be expressed as 
 
Risk Level = Probability Ranking x (Consequence)        (2.3) 
   
The probability is in term of MTBF and there are three consequences that the risk 
level evaluation; economic, health and safety, and environment.   
2.5.3 Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA)  
Root cause analysis is investigation technique that designed to help: 
1) Describe what happened during a particular occurrence  
2) Determined how it happened  
3) Understand why it happened 
Root cause Failure Analysis seeks to determine why a particular event or failure took 
place so as to correct the problem from ever occurring again in that or any other 
product. In this way, RCFA is a tool that can be used to constantly improve all aspect 
of equipment development and production. 
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Basically the step that the CUFK investigation team uses is: 
1) Conduct physical evaluation 
2) Review documents, and procedure, and check against the standard 
3) Interview the witnesses 
4) Conduct the sampling testing 
5) Coordinate across the supply chain  
2.5.4 Asset Strategy 
In the asset strategy, there three major procedures that have been apply in the CUFK; 
FMEA, Maintenance Plan (MPlan), and Spare part review. After the RCFA 
investigations are done, the causes of the failure are updated in the FMEA. The effect 
of each failure will be also identifying. In the Mplan, the maintenance types that are 
involve is preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance, predetermined 
maintenance, schedule operation and the working procedure. All this Mplan are will 
be revised and new Mplan will be proposed and upload to the SAE system. For the 
spare part review process, the spare part requirement will be review based on critical 














In this research, the methodology consists of four main parts, which is the data 
gathering and analysis on the topic, RCM comparison, Equipment Criticality 
Analysis and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis. Figure 3.1 show the procedure that 
will follow in order to carry out and implement the project. This project flow will be 
the guide for the overall project work and will ensure the project will be 
accomplished within the time given. 
3.1 Work Flow 
START
Literature Review
Concept and process of theoretical RCM and 
RCM implimented at CUF Kertih 
Data Gathering
Operation logbooks, equipment failure history, maintenance cost, overall process flow, LOX Process 
pump mechanical catalogue.
Analysis
RCM comparison, ECA , FMEA












3.2 Data Gathering and Analysis 
The data that will use for further analysis will be collected from CUFK Maintenance 
Department and from the SAP system. The collected and gathered data are:  
I. operation logbooks 
II. equipment failure history 
III. maintenance cost 
IV. overall ASU 2 process flow 
V. Mechanical catalogue. 
 
3.3 Theoretical RCM analysis comparison with the RCM implementation at 
CUFK  
This step is important to identify the First is, theoretical RCM analysis and the RCM 
implemented at CUFK are studied to understand the RCM process flow. The 
theoretical RCM source is from the RCM books and from the internet article and for 
the RCM implemented at CUFK source is from the CUFK Equipment Reliability 
Strategy handbook.  
  
3.4 Equipment Criticality assessment using the ECA method. 
The step of ECA is: 
1) Collect and evaluate the data regarding the consequence of the failure in three 
class; Economic, Health and safety, and environment. 
2) Identify the main equipment in each of the functional unit. 
3) Identify and grouping all the failure in each main equipment category 
4) Review each criticality of the main equipment by assessing the impact of the 
failures on Health Safety and Environment and also the economic (production 
loss and maintenance cost) consequence on the Risk Matrix. 
5) Calculate the risk level on each failure component 
6) Determine the Equipment criticality based on the risk level. All the dominant 
failure modes will be considered but the biggest consequence will determine 
the overall risk level for pump equipment. 






3.4.1 Risk Evaluation 
The risk evaluation is started with set of the consequence ranking of each EC 
assessment scope. The EC assessment scope with ranking can be shown in table 3.1, 
3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. 
 
Table 3.1: The Evaluation of the Mean Time Between Failure ranking [4] 




Likelihood of Failure 
Almost 
Certain 
4 Estimated time between failure (occurrence) is less than 6 
months 
 
Likely 3 Estimated time between failure (occurrence) is between 0.5 
to 4 years 














Rating Economics impact of Failure (production loss, 
maintenance, materials) 
Catastrophic 5 Stop in production exceeding “100” hours 
Significant reduced rate of production exceeding “100” 
hours  
Extensive / Massive damage - exceeding “RM 200k” of 
total economic impact 
Major 4 Stop in production between “40”  to “100” hours  
Significant reduced rate of production between “40”  to 
“100” hours 
Major damage  – “RM 150k” to “RM 200k” of total 
economic impact 
Moderate 3 Stop in production between “8” to “40” hours  
Reduced rate of production between “8” to “40” hours  
Localised / Moderate damage – exceeding “RM 100k” – 
“RM 150k” of total economic impact 
Minor 2 Stop in production lasting less than “8” hours  
Reduced rate of production lasting less than “8”  hours  
Minor damage – less than “RM 50k“ to “RM 100k” of 
total economic impact 
Insignificant 1 No effect on production within a defined period of time 





















HEALTH AND SAFETY 
Consequences 
Class 
Rating  HSE Impact of Failure ( Harm to People ) 
Catastrophic 
5 Multiple fatalities - From an accident or occupational 
illness (poisoning, cancer). 
Major 
4 Single fatality - From an accident or occupational 
illness (poisoning, cancer). 
Moderate 
3 Major injury or health effects (including Permanent 
Partial Disability) - Affecting work performance in the 
longer term, such as a prolonged absence from work. 
Irreversible health damage without loss of life, e.g. 
noise induced hearing loss, chronic back injuries. 
Minor 
2 Minor injury or health effects (Lost Time Injury) - 
Affecting work performance, such as restriction to 
activities (Restricted Work Case) or a need to take a 
few days to fully recover (Lost Workday Case). 
Limited health effects which are reversible, e.g. skin 
irritation, food poisoning. 
Insignificant 
1 Slight injury or health effects (including first aid 
case and medical treatment case) - Not affecting work 
performance or causing disability. 
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Rating Environment Impact of Failure 
Catastrophic 
5 Massive effect - Persistent severe environmental 
damage or severe nuisance extending over a large 
area. In terms of commercial or recreational use or 
nature conservancy, a major economic loss for the 
company. Constant, high exceedance of statutory or 
prescribed limits. 
Major 
4 Major effect - Severe environmental damage. The 
company is required to take extensive measures to 
restore the contaminated environment to its original 
state. Extended exceedance of statutory or 
prescribed limits. 
Moderate 
3 Localised effect - Limited loss of discharges of 
known toxicity. Repeated exceedance of statutory or 
prescribed limit. Affecting neighbourhood. 
Minor 
2 Minor effect - Contamination. Damage sufficiently 
large to attack the environment. Single exceedance 
of statutory or prescribed criterion. Single 
complaint. No permanent effect on the environment. 
Insignificant 
1 Slight effect - Local environmental damage. Within 




Using the equation of risk level, the risk level is calculated with respect to each of the 
consequence ranking.  
 






4 4 8 12 16 20 
3 3 6 9 12 15 
2 2 4 6 8 10 




1 2 3 4 5 
 
From the risk level value in table, the criticality are decided based on the risk level 
value interval 
  
Table 3.6: Criticality Based on Risk level interval 
 
Criticality Risk Level Interval 
3 1 – 3 
2 4 – 9 
1 10 – 20  
 
From criticality based on risk level interval and the risk level based on probability 
table, the Equipment Critically Matrix was developed. Appendix 4 shows the 
Equipment Critically Matrix. 
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3.5 Perform the FMEA  
A FMEA analysis usually carried out progressively in two steps: 
a) Identify the function and the standard performance of the equipment 
b) Identifying failure modes and their effects (Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis). In this analysis, the function, functional failures, failure 






























RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 RCM comparison 
The comparison can be made by focusing on the two scope; method objective, 
maintenance method and analysis process.    
  
4.1.1 Method Objective 
The both method object are shown in the table below: 
Table 4.1: Comparison of the RCM and ERS Objective  
No RCM ERS 
1 Improved equipment operating 
performance and its reliability. 
Improved equipment operating 
performance and its reliability. 
2 Greater maintenance cost 
effectiveness 
Minimize the maintenance cost and the 
production losses due to the equipment 
failure 
3 Improve safety and environmental 
integrity 
Minimize the health and safety, and 
environment consequence issue.  
 
 4.1.2 Maintenance Method 
RCM and ERS use the same maintenance method that will revise and used to prevent 
or to repair the equipment failure in order to achieve the method objective. The 



























Figure 4.1: Type of maintenance that involves in RCM and ERS. 
 
 4.1.3 Analysis Process 
The overall process flow of the analysis of RCM and ERS are shown at figure 4.2 
and 4.3.  
PLANNING AND PREPARATION
1. Identify the Team and responsibilities
2. Identify analysis item.
















1. Identify the Team and 
responsibilities
2. Identify analysis item.






4. Spare part review
IMPLEMENTATION
Upload and update the 








Figure 4.3: ERS process flow 
4.1.4 Discussion  
After understanding and analyzed the RCM and ERS concept and process, the 
similarities and differences of these two methods are identified. For the objective of 
these two methods, the comparison shows that the objectives are the same; to 
improve the reliability of the equipment and minimize the consequence of the failure. 
For the maintenance method also show the similarities of these two methods. 
 
The analysis process of the RCM and the ERS has slightly differences. For ERS, 
after the planning and preparation step, there are Risk Assessment and Equipment 
Criticality Analysis.  
 
4.2 Equipment Criticality Assessment  
 4.2.1 Maintenance cost for pump failure  
The maintenance cost of each pump failure is collected from the SAP system. The 
maintenance cost can be categorize in three part; internal manpower, external 
services and maintenance materials. The maintenance cost for pump equipment is 
shown in table 4.2 below: 
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500.00   1752.00 2252.00 
2 
P1-254A06A-Motor 
(DE) high vibration  
    57265.00 57265.00 
3 
P1-254A06A-
Mechanical seal leak 
    21907.00 21907.00 
4 
P1-254A06A-
Mechanical seal leak 
  23331.00   23331.00 
5 
P1-254A06A-Motor 
(DE) high vibration  
1008.00     1008.32 
6 
P1-254A06A-
Mechanical seal leak 





1176.00     1176.00 
8 
P1-254A06A-
Bearing (DE) high  
Temperature  

















































seal&purge g sys 

























seal&purge g sys 






























4.2.2 Calculation of the Failure Rate and MTBF of Equipment Component 
Using the equation 2.1 and 2.2, the failure rate and MTBF of the pump equipment 
component are calculated. This 2 parameter will be use in the evaluation of the 
equipment criticality. The failure rate and MTBF of each pump equipment 
component is as below:  
 










1 P1-254A06A MECHANICAL SEAL  3 4 months 
2 P1-254A06A MOTOR  2 6 months 
3 P1-254A06A BEARING (DE) 0.5 2 years 
4 P1-254A06A RECYCLE VALVE PASS 0.5 2 years 
5 P1-254A06A MANUAL ISOLATING VALVE 1 1 years 
6 P1-254A06A DISC VALVE 0.5 2 years 
7 P1-254A06A SEAL & PURGE GAS SYSTEM 
SWITCH 
0.5 2 years 
8 P1-254A06B SEAL & PURGE GAS SYSTEM 
SWITCH 
0.5 2 years 
9 P1-254A06A SEAL &PURGE G SYS VAR 
AREA MTR 
0.5 2 years 
10 P1-254A06B SEAL &PURGE G SYS VAR 
AREA MTR 
0.5 2 years 
11 P1-254A06A START ENABLE, SW. CONTACT 0.5 2 years 
12 P1-254A06B START ENABLE, SW. CONTACT 0.5 2 years 
13 P1-254A06A STOP, SW CONTACT 0.5 2 years 
14 P1-254A06B STOP, SW CONTACT 0.5 2 years 
15 P1-254A06B SEAL & PURGE GAS SYS PRESS 
REG 
0.5 2 years 
16 P1-254A06B SEAL & PURGE GAS SYS PG 0.5 2 years 
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4.2.3 Consequence of Each Failure 
Failure consequence of the pump can be categorized in three class; Health and safety, 
Environment and the Economic. This consequence classification will be use to 
evaluate the equipment criticality of the LOX Process Pump equipment. Table 4.4 
shows the consequence evaluation for the health and safety, and environment. Table 
4.5 shows the consequence evaluation for economic. 
 
Table 4.4: The evaluation of the health and safety, and environment consequence [5].  
No System / Subsystem / Equip Desc 
Consequence class 
Health and safety Environment 
1 P1-254A06A MECHANICAL SEAL  No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight effect 
2 P1-254A06A MOTOR  No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight effect 
3 P1-254A06A BEARING (DE) No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight effect 
4 P1-254A06A RECYCLE VALVE PASS No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight effect 
5 P1-254A06A MANUAL ISOLATING 
VALVE 
No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight effect 
6 P1-254A06A DISC VALVE No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight effect 
7 P1-254A06A SEAL & PURGE GAS 
SYSTEM SWITCH 
No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight effect 
8 P1-254A06B SEAL & PURGE GAS 
SYSTEM SWITCH 
No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight effect 
9 P1-254A06A SEAL &PURGE G SYS VAR 
AREA MTR 
No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight effect 
10 P1-254A06B SEAL &PURGE G SYS VAR 
AREA MTR 
No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight effect 
11 P1-254A06A START ENABLE, SW. 
CONTACT 
No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight effect 
12 P1-254A06B START ENABLE, SW. 
CONTACT 
No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight effect 
13 P1-254A06A STOP, SW CONTACT No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight effect 
14 P1-254A06B STOP, SW CONTACT No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight effect 
15 P1-254A06B SEAL & PURGE GAS SYS 
PRESS REG 
No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight effect 
16 P1-254A06B SEAL & PURGE GAS SYS 
PG 
No injury / Near Miss / 
FAC 






















2252.00 21907.00 23331.00 5937.00 1176.00 1120.00 55723.00 
2 P1-254A06A 
MOTOR (DE) 












1285.00 53445.12 54730.12 
6 P1-254A06A DISC 
VALVE 
448.00 448.00 
7 P1-254A06A SEAL 
& PURGE GAS 
SYSTEM SWITCH 
5000.00 5000.00 
8 P1-254A06B SEAL 
& PURGE GAS 
SYSTEM SWITCH 
5000.00 5000.00 
9 P1-254A06A SEAL 
&PURGE G SYS 
VAR AREA MTR 
5000.00 5000.00 
10 P1-254A06B SEAL 
&PURGE G SYS 





















15 P1-254A06B SEAL 
& PURGE GAS 
SYS PRESS REG 
5000.00 5000.00 
16 P1-254A06B SEAL 









4.2.4 Risk Level Value of each pump equipment failure 
The evaluation of risk level of the pump equipment failure are based on the 
probability, economic, health and safety, environment consequence rating. The risk 
value can be calculated using the equation 2.3. The value of the risk level of each 
pump equipment failure can be shown at table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6: The value of the risk level of each equipment failure 
No 
System / Subsystem 
/ Equip Desc 
Prob. 
ranking 









4 8 4 4 8 
2 P1-254A06A 
MOTOR  
4 20 4 4 20 
3 P1-254A06A 
BEARING (DE) 









3 3 3 3 3 
6 P1-254A06A DISC 
VALVE 
3 3 3 3 3 
7 P1-254A06A SEAL 
& PURGE GAS 
SYSTEM SWITCH 
3 3 3 3 3 
8 P1-254A06B SEAL 
& PURGE GAS 
SYSTEM SWITCH 
3 3 3 3 3 
9 P1-254A06A SEAL 
&PURGE G SYS 
VAR AREA MTR 
3 3 3 3 3 
10 P1-254A06B SEAL 
&PURGE G SYS 
VAR AREA MTR 









3 3 3 3 3 
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13 P1-254A06A STOP, 
SW CONTACT 
3 3 3 3 3 
14 P1-254A06B STOP, 
SW CONTACT 
3 3 3 3 3 
15 P1-254A06B SEAL 
& PURGE GAS 
SYS PRESS REG 
3 3 3 3 3 
16 P1-254A06B SEAL 
& PURGE GAS 
SYS PG 
3 3 3 3 3 
 
4.2.4 Equipment Criticality Assessment for 2008-2009 
Using the information from the pump equipment MTBF calculation, table 4.3, 4.4, 
the risk level of the equipment failure and the risk matrix, each of the pump 
equipment criticality are evaluated. The Equipment Criticality Assessment for year 
2007 until 2009 is shown in table 4.5. 
 
4.2.5 Discussion 
After Equipment Criticality Analysis has been done, the result shows that only the 
motor pump is fall in criticality of one. The two aspects that contribute to this 
criticality, first is the pump motor MTBF. The pump MTBF value is 6 months and 
the ranking is 4. This value is fall in highest ranking for the MTBF evaluation. 
Second contribution is in the economic consequence. The money losses from this 
pump motor failure are RM 216769.00. this value of money losses are indicate that 
the economic consequence ranking for this particular equipment are fall in the 
ranking 5. So, with the lowest criticality value, the pump motor high vibration failure 
will be the first priority of problem solving analysis effort that the CUF Kertih 
should  consider. 
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Table 4.5: Equipment Criticality Assessment for the 2008-2009 
No 













Total (RM) ECON H&S ENV Consequence 
1 P1-254A06A MECHANICAL 
SEAL  
MROT 0 55723 55723 Minor 
Damage  
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 
MINOR < 6 month 2 
2 P1-254A06A MOTOR  MROT 0 216769 216769 Extensive 
Damage 
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 
CATASTROPHIC 0.5 - 4 
years 
1 
3 P1-254A06A BEARING (DE) MROT 0 7532 7532 Slight 
Effect 
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 
INSIGNIFICANT 0.5 - 4 
years 
3 
4 P1-254A06A RECYCLE 
VALVE PASS 
MSTAT 0 3217 3217 Slight 
Effect 
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 
INSIGNIFICANT 0.5 - 4 
years 
3 
5 P1-254A06A MANUAL 
ISOLATING VALVE 
MSTAT 0 54730 54730 Minor 
Damage  
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 
MINOR 0.5 - 4 
years 
2 
6 P1-254A06A DISC VALVE MSTAT 0 448 448 Slight 
Effect 
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 
INSIGNIFICANT 0.5 - 4 
years 
3 
7 P1-254A06A SEAL & 
PURGE GAS SYSTEM 
SWITCH 
INST 0 5000 5000 Slight 
Effect 
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 
INSIGNIFICANT 0.5 - 4 
years 
3 
8 P1-254A06B SEAL & 
PURGE GAS SYSTEM 
SWITCH 
INST 0 5000 5000 Slight 
Effect 
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 





9 P1-254A06A SEAL 
&PURGE G SYS VAR AREA 
MTR 
INST 0 5000 5000 Slight 
Effect 
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 
INSIGNIFICANT 0.5 - 4 
years 
3 
10 P1-254A06B SEAL &PURGE 
G SYS VAR AREA MTR 
INST 0 5000 5000 Slight 
Effect 
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 
INSIGNIFICANT 0.5 - 4 
years 
3 
11 P1-254A06A START 
ENABLE, SW. CONTACT 
INST 0 4000 4000 Slight 
Effect 
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 
INSIGNIFICANT 0.5 - 4 
years 
3 
12 P1-254A06B START 
ENABLE, SW. CONTACT 
INST 0 4000 4000 Slight 
Effect 
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 
INSIGNIFICANT 0.5 - 4 
years 
3 
13 P1-254A06A STOP, SW 
CONTACT 
INST 0 4000 4000 Slight 
Effect 
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 
INSIGNIFICANT 0.5 - 4 
years 
3 
14 P1-254A06B STOP, SW 
CONTACT 
INST 0 4000 4000 Slight 
Effect 
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 
INSIGNIFICANT 0.5 - 4 
years 
3 
15 P1-254A06B SEAL & 
PURGE GAS SYS PRESS 
REG 
INST 0 5000 5000 Slight 
Effect 
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 
INSIGNIFICANT 0.5 - 4 
years 
3 
16 P1-254A06B SEAL & 
PURGE GAS SYS PG 
INST 0 5000 5000 Slight 
Effect 
No injury / 
Near Miss / 
FAC 
No / slight 
effect 





4.3 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis  
4.3.1 Function and Standard Performance of LOX process pump motor 
For starting the FMEA the function and standard performance of the LOX Process 
Pump are identify. This standard performance can be the indication of the pump 
failure. Table 4.6 show the function and standard performance of the LOX Process 
Pump. 
 
Table 4.6: Function and standard performance of the LOX Process Pump. 
NO  FUNCTION  STANDARD PERFORMANCE  
1  To rotate the 
shaft and the 
impeller.  
Rotate with speed of 7100rpm with allowable vibration 
velocity 3 mm/s and the peak to peak amplitude are not 
more than 106 μm.  
 
 4.3.2 FMEA for Motor High Vibration Problem 
 
From the ECA result, the failure that is to be selected to be analyzed using the FMEA 
























The Using FMEA method, this method are identified each level of the failure mode 
of the functional failure of the pump motor. The first level of the failure mode 
contains 4 failure mode, bent shaft, rotor unbalanced, bearing damaged and 
looseness. And for the second failure mode level contains 15 failure modes. The 
second level of the failure mode indicates that the occurrence of the first failure 

































1.1 Bearing damaged  High Vibration  











2.1 Bearing damaged  Shaft scratches or crack  
2.2 Impeller crack  High Vibration.  
2.3 Bent shaft  Bearing or motor damage  














1. Bearing seize, overheat 
and shorten life span.  
2. Motor damage. 
3.2 Wrong grease spec 1. Bearing seize, overheat 
and shorten life span.  
2. Motor damage.  
3.3 Bearing 
offspec/material 
1. Bearing seize, overheat 
and shorten life span.  
2. Motor damage.  
3.4 Bearing wornout 1. Bearing seize, overheat 
and shorten life span.  
2. Motor damage.  
3.5 Residue grease left 
in 
1. Bearing seize, overheat 
and shorten life span.  









4.1 Off spec nut Motor & pump high vibration. 
4.2 Wrong torque Motor & pump high vibration. 
4.3 Support damaged Motor & pump high vibration. 
4.4 Bolt and nut 
corrosion 




CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
From this project, several conclusions could be drawn from the analysis results. 
There were also some recommendations for future work that could probably be 
carried out to enhance the Reliability Centered Maintenance implemented for this 
case study and to further improve the accuracy of results. 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
The objectives of this project have been achieved throughout literature reviews, data 
gathering and analysis. This project has concluded that: 
a) From the RCM comparison, the objective of the theoretical RCM and the 
RCM implemented (ERS) are mostly same. There small differences in the 
process flow of these two methods. In ERS, there are two additional analyses, 
Risk Assessment and Equipment Criticality Analysis.   
b)  From the Equipment Criticality Assessment 2008-2009, the only motor 
pump component is in the criticality of one. There are two aspect that 
contribute this criticality; low value of MTBF and also high maintenance cost 
for that equipment.  This indicates that, the priority of the effort that has to be 
done to pump motor high vibration problem. 
c) From the FMEA, this method are identified each level of the failure mode of 
the functional failure of the pump motor. The first level of the failure mode 
contains 4 failure mode, bent shaft, rotor unbalanced, bearing damaged and 
looseness. And for the second failure mode level contains 15 failure modes. 
The second level of the failure mode indicates that the occurrence of the first 
failure mode can be link into several way of other failure mode. The analysis 
shows the relationship between the first level failure mode and the second 









There are some recommendations for future work that could probably be carried out 
to enhance the Reliability Centered Maintenance implemented for this case study and 
to further improve the accuracy of results. The recommendations are: 
1) Find the actual failure rate from the pump supplier to calculate the reliability 
of the LOX process pump for that particular period (2008-2009).  
2) To carry out the Root Cause Failure Analysis to identify the major root cause 
of the pump motor failure. 
3) To perform the Mplan analysis to find appropriate maintenance plan in order 
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